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PHILOSOPHIES IN COLLISION: A PERSPECTIVE OF
FLPMA
Ward A. Shanahan*
Alan L. Joscelyn**
This article began life as a discussion of the effect of The Federal Land
Policy and Management Act, or FLPMA,1 on mining claims and mining
development in Montana. It soon became evident, however, that it is
impossible to discuss FLPMA and its effects in a vacuum. The rights of
public domain mineral developers are defined and effected not only by a
series of federal enactments, including FLPMA, going back to the Mining
Law of 18722 and earlier, but also by various, evolving constitutional
doctrines. Only when the larger picture is considered can a true perspective
be glimpsed as to FLPMA's effects. Accordingly, the modest objective of
this article will be to discuss, in general terms, factors which created and
are creating the current trends in public land policy, and where FLPMA
fits in this picture.
By way of introduction and analogy, the role of FLPMA was to
establish a beachhead for social land planning in front of the fortress of the
Mining Law of 1872. Planning for the invasion was perhaps first articu-
lated clearly by the Public Land Law Review Commission Report
(PLLRC), in its 1970 report to the President and Congress.3 Following up
the recommendations of the Report, the sponsors and staff which initially
drew the FLPMA bill proceeded cautiously. It was announced merely as
an attempt to give the Bureau of Land Management "notice" of those
mining claims which were established on the federal domain. The early
BLM public literature posited it was only fair that Uncle Sam know where
mining claims were located, emphasizing the difficulty and cost to the
BLM to search the courthouses of the West for claims, and then to
determine which ones were valid. The concern was addressed by a provision
for duplicate filing with the BLM state offices as a means of giving notice of
intention to hold. However, proposals change during the legislative process
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1. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1982).
2. 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-24, 26-30, 33-35, 37, 39-42, 47 (1982).
3. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND (1970).
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and this happened in the case of FLPMA. Provisions were tacked on during
the final conference committees that provided for absolute forfeiture of
claims if the regulations adopted by the Bureau, and filing deadlines in the
Act, were not strictly obeyed. From that point on, the private property
rights acquired by the mineral claim holder under the Mining Law of 1872
were under assault. The war was on; the new "land ethics" of FLPMA and
its recent relatives on one side, and the free enterprise philosophy of the
1872 Mining Law on the other.
I. PHILOSOPHIES IN COLLISION
A. The Free Private Access to the Public Lands for Mining-The
Mining Law of 1872
A comprehensive overview of the Mining Law of 1872 is found in
Hardrock Mining on the Public Lands,4 and two articles in the Public
Land and Resources Law Digest.' However, a succinct statement of its
essence, as viewed by miners, can be found in the comments of Congress-
man Nick Joe Rahall, II, of West Virginia, Chairman of the House Interior
Subcommittee on Mining and Natural Resources, which held an oversight
hearing on FLPMA:
The Mining Law of 1872 invoked strong emotions from those
who engage in activities under its auspices. They viewed this
statute which remained fundamentally unchanged since Presi-
dent Grant signed it into law, as a basic right to use their
entrepreneurship and explore the public domain for minerals,
produce those minerals and even gain title to the land without
federal government interference. This is the principle of self-
initiation and free access that is so cherished as being the
hardrock miner's right.6
In fact, Congressman Rahall's statement was more than just a
distillation of the testimony of mining advocates who appeared at the
hearing. The 1872 Mining Law, 7 was intended to formally recognize and
preserve the local customs or rules of miners which found their origin in the
European idea of "free mining," or "bergbaufreiheit," as it was called in
German, and translated into English law as, literally the freedom of the
mountains. Instead of the mere location and ownership of a mineral vein
which had existed under prior law, the claim became an entry upon land
4. Shanahan, Hardrock Mining on the Public Lands, 2 PUB. LAND L. REv. 57 (1981).
5. Knutson & Morris, Coping With the General Mining Law of 1872 in the 1980's, 16 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 411 (1981), reprinted in 19 PUB. LAND AND RESOURCES L. DIG. 10 (1982); Hiscock,
FLPMA's Wilderness Study Areas: Valid Existing Rights and the Nonimpairment Standard, 5 J.
ENERGY L. & PoL'Y. 69 (1983), reprinted in 22 PUB. LAND AND RESOURCES L. DIG. 128 (1985).
6. 133 Cong. Rec. E2583 (1987).
7. 17 Stat. 91 (1872).
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based upon the discovery of mineral. With this law, a claim was considered
real property in a much broader sense than before. In 1877 the Supreme
Court of the United States confirmed that mining claims on public lands
are property in the fullest sense of the word, which may be sold,
transferred, mortgaged and inherited without infringing upon the title of
the United States.8
The Amendment of 1875 set forth general requirements for location,
recording, and assessment work, and provided:
[That] the miners of each mining district may make regulations
not in conflict with the laws of the United States, or with the laws
of the State or Territory. . ...
Thus, the laws of the mining associations governed until they
eventually became codified as state law. The United States Supreme
Court, in Lockhart v. Johnson,'0 upheld local statutory regulations
supplemental to and not inconsistent with federal mining laws.,,
The basic precepts of the 1872 Mining law while supplemented and
reworked to some extent over the years, continued basically unchanged
into the 1970s. One function of the Public Land Law Review Commission
of 1970 was to examine these precepts and their continued vitality and
validity. As noted above, following the Commission's report the trend
began toward a new direction.
B. The Development of Social Land Use Planning Doctrines for
the Public Lands
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA)
has several close relatives. The Wilderness Act, 2 the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act,'13 and the National Forest Management Act of 1976's are
significant examples. The Congressional policy statements from the acts
ring with the philosophies behind them. The Wilderness Act was to "assure
that. . .expanding settlement and. . .mechanization, [do] not oc-
cupy. . . all areas within the United States. . .leaving no
lands. . .[protected]. . .in their natural condition. ... , The Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act was to preserve "certain selected rivers. . .in free-
flowing condition. . .for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future
8. Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762, 767 (1877).
9. Act of Feb. 11, 1875, ch. 41, 18 Stat. 315 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1982)).
10. 181 U.S. 516 (1901).
1. Id. at 527.
12. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982).
13. Id. §§ 1271-1287.
14. Pub. L. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976)(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16
u.S.C.).
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).
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generations." 16
In FLPMA, Congress declared 13 specific purposes, among them, to
manage the public lands in a manner to protect the quality of scientific,
scenic, historical, ecological, environmental air and atmospheric, water
resource, and archeological values, and where appropriate, preserve and
protect certain public lands in their natural condition and provide food and
habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals, and provide for outdoor
recreation and human occupancy and use.
C. Objectives in Collision
The new trends conflicted, in the eyes of many, with the tradition of
the 1872 Mining Law. The statement of the Public Resource Foundation
submitted at an oversight hearing held June 23, 1987 by the U.S. House of
Representatives Subcommittee on Mining and Natural Resources of the
Interior Committee presented the problem squarely:
The 1872 Mining Law is the last of the 19th Century public land
disposal laws remaining on the books today-putting it funda-
mentally at odds with contemporary federal land policy, ex-
pressed in FLPMA, favoring retention of the public lands and
federal ownership.17
The Foundation stated further:
It is little wonder that somewhere between 40 and 50 percent of
the public domain has been withdrawn from appropriation under
the mining law. Because its terms are absolute, with no provision
at all for circumstances where mining could feasibly be a
subordinate or conditional use, the 1872 Mining Law threatens
the rationality of federal land planning and management, and
even some areas that might otherwise be most promising for
mining.18
Most of the groups favoring changes in the 1872 Mining Law who
appeared at the Oversight Hearing shared the opinion that the 1872 law
afforded land management agencies too little discretion to control the
environmental effects of mining and insure the compatibility of mining
with other public land uses. They favored a federal land leasing policy as an
alternative. 19
The miners felt that the 1872 law worked well to encourage the
production of minerals to supply the domestic economy and prevent
dangerous dependence on unstable foreign sources. Noting that minerals
can only be mined where economic deposits are found, they argued that
16. Id. § 1271.
17. 133 Cong. Rec. D868 (1987).
18. Id.
19. BIackstone, Rocky Mountain News, July 1987.
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increased discretion for land managers would mean the demise of mining
on such lands. Miners pointed to federal coal leasing as an example of a
program hopelessly mired in Congress, and to bureaucratic bungling
causing repeated leasing suspensions even as the nation was trying to
increase coal production to reduce dependence on foreign oil.
These divergent views formed the backdrop as Congress proceeded to
consider the FLPMA bill. Many diverse concerns including minerals, food,
timber, fiber, recreation, critical environmental concern, and solitude all
received attention in the ultimate Act. These considerations, in some cases,
were made possible by the federal treasury though a provision "to
compensate States and local governments for burdens created as a result of
the immunity of Federal lands from State and local taxation." 20 A reading
of the special definitions in 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (areas of critical environmen-
tal concerns, multiple use, public lands, withdrawal, and principal and
major uses) shows the influence of various lobbyists who had their say as
this bill moved on to its adoption.
II. ARENAS OF CONFLICT
Passage of FLPMA did not, by any means, resolve the conflicts
between those who defended the old and those who espoused the new. It and
its "new wave" brethren instead have provided the arena for continuing
debate. FLPMA provides that, except as provided in other specified
sections of the Act, no provision of FLPMA "shall in any way amend the
Mining Law of 1872 or impair the rights of any locators or claims under
that Act, including, but not limited to, rights of ingress and egress. "21
FLPMA further provided that "[iln managing the public lands the
Secretary shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands."22 As can be seen,
the section contains the seeds of internal conflict. It and other sections
produced controversy from the date of enactment.
A. The Recordation of Mining Claims with the BLM
One of the first controversies concerned the section of FLPMA which
provides for the recordation of mining claims.2" It stated that within a three
year period following the date of approval of the Act, the owners of
unpatented lode or placer mining claims were to file instruments with the
BLM required by the Act. After that, these owners were required, prior to
20. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(13).
21. Id. § 1732(b).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 1744.
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December 31st of each year, to file notices of assessment work or intention
to hold their claims with the appropriate BLM state office. The penalty for
failure was an irrebuttable presumption of abandonment, and there were
no exceptions provided.24
In a case in which the authors were involved, 5 the court found the
irrebuttable presumption of abandonment provision unconstitutional on
the grounds it destroyed a valuable property right without hearing. The
claim owner in this case had failed to send BLM an exact photocopy of his
notices of location prior to the deadline.2 6 Despite the fact he had sent BLM
all of the information on the notices, together with all other material
required by FLPMA, the BLM took the position that, unless the actual
notice was furnished, the claims were deemed abandoned.27 The court
found that the claim holder's efforts "substantially complied with the law"
but, had it not found the conclusive presumption unconstitutional, would
have been required to find the claim holder's efforts unavailing, in view of
the wording of the Act.28 Apparently the United States did not want to
challenge the court's conclusion regarding the constitutional issue at that
time, because it did not appeal the case.
However, as is now universally known, in the later case of United
States v. Locke, 9 the miner did not fare so well. There, the claim owners,
after allegedly receiving misleading information from a BLM employee,
filed the annual notice of intent to hold or proof of assessment work on
December 31, rather than "prior to December 31" as is required by the
statute." This failure was held to work a forfeiture of the claims.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that FLPMA met the three stan-
dards laid down in Texaco, Inc. v. Short,a' for the imposition of new
regulatory restraints on existing property rights. The Court said the
following:
[I]n the regulation of private property rights, the Constitution
offers the courts no warrant to inquire into whether some other
scheme might be more rational or desirable than the one chosen
by Congress; as long as the legislative scheme is a rational way of
reaching Congress' objectives, the efficacy of alternative routes is
for Congress alone to consider. "It is enough to say that the Act
approaches the problem of [developing a national recording
24. Id.
25. Rogers v. U.S., 575 F. Supp. 4 (D. Mont. 1982).
26. Id. at 6.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 9-11.
29. 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
30. Id. at 88-91.
31. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
[Vol. 9
PHILOSOPHIES IN COLLISION
system] rationally; whether a [different notice scheme] would
have been wiser or more practical under the circumstances is not
a question of constitution dimension." 2
B. 'The Bureau of Land Management Wilderness Studies, 43
U.S.C. § 1782
Another provision of FLPMA which insured a clash between mineral
development and conservation advocates was that which provided for a
wilderness inventory.33 The wilderness inventory was to include mineral
surveys to be conducted by the Geological Survey and the Bureau of Mines
to determine the mineral values, if any, present in those roadless areas of
5,000 acres or more, and roadless "islands" of public lands identified
during the inventory. 4 In the meantime, those areas were to be managed
"so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as
wilderness, subject, however, to the continuation of existing mining and
grazing uses and mineral leasing in the manner and degree in which the
same was being conducted" on the date of approval of the Act. 5 The
Secretary of the Interior could, by regulation or otherwise, "take any
action required to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands
and their resources or to afford environmental protection."
3 6
A similar provision referring specifically to the California Desert
Conservation Area stated that "[s]ubject to valid existing rights, nothing
in this Act shall affect the applicability of the United States mining laws on
the public lands within the California Desert Conservation Area, ex-
cept. . . [those] measures as may be reasonable to protect. . .against
undue impairment. . . .,8 The question presented by both sections was
whether the undue impairment and unnecessary degradation standards
were absolute.
In Utah v. Andrus,3 8 the court approved BLM regulations which did
not permanently deprive the claimant of access to its claims, stating that:
BLM's authority is, however, limited to preventing permanent
impairment of potential wilderness values. Although it is not
explicitly provided for in FLPMA, it is consistent with Con-
gress's attempts to balance competing interests and with the
Wilderness Act which provides the legislative backdrop for
Section 603 to find that if a given activity will have only a
32. Locke, 471 U.S. at 109.
33. 43 U.S.C. § 1782.
34. Id. § 1782(a).
35. Id. § 1782(c).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 1781(0.
38. 486 F. Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979).
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temporary effect on wilderness characteristics and will not
foreclose potential wilderness designation then that activity
should be allowed to proceed. 9
Under this case, mining, in the final analysis, was deemed to be a
temporary disturbance.
In the case of oil and gas lessees, somewhat the same result was
achieved. In Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Assoc. v. Andrus,4° also known
as RMOGA I, an association of lessees contended that the BLM regula-
tions effectively prevented development of their leasehold interests. The
court, after reviewing Sections 603(c) and 701(h) of FLPMA and
comparing them to the Wilderness Act of 1964 found that balanced
multiple use was the underlying Congressional mandate of FLPMA and
interpreted the Act's introductory sections to require one use should not
suffer for the benefit of another.4' The court held further that a Depart-
ment of Interior solicitor's opinion in 1979 which effectively limited the use
of wilderness study areas was contrary to the statute and therefore the
Congressional intent, and would not be upheld.42
This decision went much further than Utah v. Andrus 3 which had left
open the possibility that as long as multiple uses were fairly equivalent
Congressional intent was being carried out. RMOGA Idistinguished Utah
v. Andrus as involving access rights and not mineral lease development
rights." In October 1981, however, the solicitor of the Department of the
Interior issued a supplementary opinion to the 1979 opinion. The opinion
addressed directly the problem raised by RMOGA L The solicitor stated he
did not necessarily agree with the court's method of reaching its conclusion
and, although expressing the intention to follow RMOGA I, the solicitor
stated that RMOGA I went too far in finding that post-FLPMA leases
should be uninhibited by the nonimpairment standard and advised lessees
that their leases were only granted by the Secretary with the limited rights
inherent in Section 603(c) of FLPMA.45 Leases not so affected, according
to the solicitor, were those covered by the grandfather clause in FLPMA.46
The solicitor then called for a review of each oil and gas lease in light of the
nonimpairment standard.47
On appeal (RMOGA 10,48 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
39. Id. at 1007.
40. 500 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Wyo. 1980).
41. Id. at 1344.
42. Id. at 1345-6.
43. 486 F. Supp. 995.
44. RMOGA I, 500 F. Supp. at 1344.
45. 88 I.D. 909 (1981).
46. Id. at 910.
47. Id. at 912-14.
48. Rocky Mtn. Oil and Gas Ass'n. v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982).
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reasserted the rules of statutory construction and stated where the
language of a statute is unclear, deference should be given to the
controlling agencies' interpretation so long as reasonable."9 The court
declared the lower court's interpretation illogical as it would give prefer-
ence to mineral leasing activities over mining and grazing uses.50 Adopting
the 1981 solicitor's opinion, the court said that the non-impairment
standard remains the norm with respect to all mineral leases regardless of
their date of issuance." The RMOGA 11 case left the question of the effect
of the grandfather clause in Section 701(h) for subsequent litigation.
The question remains unresolved as to whether the pro-wilderness
language of Section 603(c) and the pro-development language of Section
701 (h) have actually been harmonized. One writer finds a flaw in the 1981
solicitor's opinion because the Mineral Lands Leasing Act52 granted the
Secretary of the Interior authority "in the interest of conservation" to
direct and assent to the "suspension of operations and productions under
any lease granted."58
III. GOVERNMENTS IN COLLISION
The debate over national policy regarding mineral development is
reenacted in every state with any significant amount of public (federal)
land, and to the extent the state's policies may differ from federal policy,
another arena for conflict is created. Western states, with large areas of
public lands, find themselves in the spotlight in this arena. The United
States derives authority regarding public lands from various portions of the
U.S. Constitution, both as sovereign and as proprietor of public lands. The
Property Clause,54 the Supremacy Clause,55 and the Tenth Amendment"
are the essential constitutional provisions involved.
A. The Property Clause
The Property Clause simply provides:
The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States. .. .
Congress's authority is broad and plainly expressed as to public lands.
49. Id. at 746-9.
50. Id. at 746.
51. Id. at 750.
52. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1982).
53. Hiscock, supra note 5, at 139.
54. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
55. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
57. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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The questions which have posed problems have been the extent to which
Congress may, under the Property Clause, legislate so as to effect non-
public property, and the extent to which, if at all, the Tenth Amendment is
a limit upon Congress's powers under the Property Clause.
In Camfield v. United States, 58 which involved an act of Congress
that declared all enclosures of public lands to be unlawful, defendant had
erected, entirely on private land, a fence which surrounded 20,000 acres of
public lands. The Court found the act constitutional because the United
States, in addition to its sovereign rights, has the rights of an ordinary
proprietor, and by exercising its proprietary rights could bring an action to
abate the fence.
In Kleppe v. New Mexico, 9 the state challenged the Wild Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros Act60 relying upon the Camfield case. The
state contended the Act was not directed to the protection of the public
lands and therefore was enacted in excess of Congress's authority under the
Property Clause. The Court stated Camfield affirmed congressional power
to regulate activities on private lands that affect public lands, and found
that Congress had clear power over public lands to regulate and protect
wild life living there.
In Minnesota By Alexander v. Block,"1 the court held that the power
of Congress under the Property Clause extended to the regulation of
conduct, whether taking place on federal or private land, which threatens
the designated purpose of federal lands. The court found this to be a
necessary incident of the power Congress has to dedicate federal lands for
particular purposes. Ernest Baynard in his book Public Land Law and
Procedure62 states that if the Tenth Amendment is to retain any vestige of
meaning, it should at least be applicable where Congress is using the
Property Clause to regulate activities taking place off federal lands. A
collision in this "penumbra" area has not yet clearly occurred, but the
possibility is always there.
B. The Supremacy Clause, Basis of the Preemption Doctrine
The Supremacy Clause provides:
This constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be
58. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
59. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
60. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982).
61. 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981).
62. E. BAYNARD, PUBLIC LAND LAW AND PROCEDURE 27 (1986).
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bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to
contrary notwithstanding.6 -
This provides the basis of preemption under the Property Clause
discussed in Kleppe v. New Mexico." Where there is actual conflict with
federal law, the Supremacy Clause forces state law to give way and allows
the federal law to prevail.
The preemption doctrine applies as a matter of course when compli-
ance with the state and federal laws is impossible. The more difficult
situation occurs when there is not actual and necessary conflict between the
federal and state laws involved. In these instances, the courts must
determine Congress's intent to occupy a given field or "preempt" state law
in that field.65 The following factors are used to determine whether
preemption will occur: (1) the subject matter of the law and whether or not
it falls within an area that has traditionally been regulated by Congress; (2)
whether it is in a field that demands broad national authority; (3) the scope
and extent of the federal regulatory scheme; (4) whether the federal
statute deals with areas that have traditionally been regulated by the
states; (5) the extent to which the federal regulatory scheme seeks to
protect the same amenities that the state statutes seek to protect.6
In Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp.,67 a preemption case decided
after Kleppe, the BLM had issued an oil and gas lease on 120 acres in the
Los Padres National Forest. A drilling permit was issued by the Geological
Survey and a required Forest Service permit had been obtained.68 In
addition, the California Resources Agency, Division of Oil and Gas, had
approved the exploration. 9 After drilling operations were commenced in
April 1976, the Ventura County Planning Commission advised Gulf it had
to obtain an open space use permit under the Ventura zoning regulations if
it wished to continue its drilling operations."0 Gulf refused and Ventura
County brought suit. The court found preemption, stating:
Although we recognize that federal incursions upon the historic
police power of the states are not found without good cause
(citing authorities), we must affirm because "under the circum-
stances of this particular case, [the local ordinances] stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress." (citing authorities) "[W] here
those state laws conflict. . .with other legislation passed pursu-
63. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
64. 426 U.S. 529.
65. BAYNARD, supra note 62, at 30.
66. Id. at 31.
67. 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979).
68. Id. at 1082.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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ant to the Property Clause, the law is clear: the state laws must
recede." (citing Kleppe) 1
C. Granite Rock v. California Coastal Commission: Application of
the Preemption Doctrine-Balancing of Interests
The Granite Rock saga is important because it involves a good modern
treatment of the balancing of government interests. In Granite Rock," the
California Coastal Commission attempted to require limestone miners on
Forest Service lands to obtain permits under state rules to protect the
ecologically fragile coastal zone. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit relied upon a 1984 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp.,"' and said:
State law can be preempted in either of two general ways. If
Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state
law falling within that field is preempted. (citations omitted) If
Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the
matter in question, state law is still preempted to the extent it
actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to
comply with both state and federal law, (citation omitted), or
where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. . .(citation
omitted) (quoting Silkwood).
The case presented a situation arising under the mining laws and the
court talked about the prohibition-regulation distinction, i.e., whether
the state regulations can prohibit mining altogether. Using Ventura
County as a point of departure, the court said the state could not prohibit
federally authorized use either temporarily or permanently.
However, on March 24, 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit's Granite Rock decision.7 6 The Court held that the federal
and state laws were not in actual conflict, and that since Granite Rock had
not sought a permit from the Coastal Commission there were no facts to
indicate what terms and conditions the Commission would impose, and
therefore the Court was unwilling to assume the Commission would exceed
its power or impose unlawful restrictions.7 7 In effect, the decision was so
narrow that it did little to clarify the issue of a state's power to regulate
private activity on federal land. The Court held only that California could
71. Id. at 1086.
72. Granite Rock Co. v. Calif. Coastal Comm., 590 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 768
F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 94 L. Ed.2d 577 (1987).
73. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
74. Granite Rock, 768 F.2d at 1080.
75. Id. at 1082.
76. 94 L. Ed. 2d 577.
77. Id.
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impose reasonable environmental regulations on private miners and that a
permit process was an appropriate way to gauge this regulation. The Court
also discussed the fact that the Forest Service regulations contained no
evidence of an intent to preempt. It is entirely possible the Court would
have reached a finding of preemption had the Forest Service regulations
contained an express statement to that effect.
IV. CURRENT AREAS OF INTEREST
There are several areas of current interest to those concerned with
mineral development on public lands in which the conflicting philosophies
and federal-state issues discussed above may come into play.
A. Wilderness Act and Mining Activities
The Wilderness Act special provisions,78 allowed until midnight,
December 31, 1983, for location of new mining claims in areas designated
as wilderness. As of January 1, 1984, minerals in lands designated as
wilderness were withdrawn from all forms of appropriation under the
mining laws and also from disposition under the laws pertaining to mineral
leasing and all amendments thereto.79 The prime question is what rights
accrue to a mining claim located within a wilderness area prior to the
January 1, 1984 cutoff? The Act provided that:
Mining locations lying within the boundaries of said wilderness
areas shall be held and used solely for mining or processing
operations and uses reasonably incident thereto; and hereafter,
subject to valid existing rights, all patents issued under the
mining laws of the United States affecting national forest lands
designated by this chapter as wilderness areas shall convey title
to the mineral deposits within the claim. . .but each such patent
shall reserve to the United States all title in or to the surface of the
lands. . .and no use of the surface. . .not reasonably required
for. . .mining or prospecting shall be allowed except as other-
wise expressly provided in this chapter ... .80
One of the key terms used is "valid existing rights."'81 The restrictions
of wilderness designation as to use, patent, and withdrawal of nonlocated
lands, are subject to valid existing rights. The phrase is rife with
unanswered questions: To what extent are the rights traditionally thought
to have been conferred by the 1872 Mining Law subject to reasonable
regulation? Do miners have a "valid existing right" to locate additional
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (1982).
79. Id.§ 1133(d)(3).
80. Id.
81. This phrase is carried forth into the legislation to designate specific wilderness areas in
Montana. See S. 2751, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(c) (1988).
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claims around a core area of claims to provide for an economic mining
operation?
With regard to determining the validity of mining claims, the
Department of the Interior has adopted a fairly evenhanded policy with
respect to the evaluation of nonwilderness mining claims, which we must
assume will also be applicable to those claims within wilderness areas.
Prior to 1983, the BLM and Forest Service had been fashioning some strict
marketability concepts based upon present market conditions, the effect of
which was to make it far more difficult to hold a claim against government
challenge or to patent. In 1983, however, in In Re Pacific Coast Molybde-
num Co., 2 the Interior Board of Land Appeals rejected the idea that
inquiry into present marketability tied a mineral to a particular price or to
a particular cost on a particular day:
"Present marketability" has never encompassed examination of
either cost or price factors as of a specific, finite moment of time,
without reference to other economic factors. Rather, the question
of whether something is "presently marketable at a profit"
simply means that a mining claimant must show that, as a
present fact, considering historic price and cost factors and
assuming that they will continue, there is a reasonable likelihood
of success. .. 3
B. Regulation by Agency Rule
Since FLPMA, comprehensive new surface management regulations
applicable to mining operations have been enacted by the two agencies now
responsible for the bulk of public domain lands, the BLM and the Forest
Service. While both sets of regulations specifically acknowledge the
statutory right of access, they also clearly state that exercise of access
rights will (if the surface is disturbed as the result of the exercise of the
right) be subject to the general management rules. The potential for
conflict between the statutory access right and the agency's surface
management rules is clear.
The BLM's authority to create rules for surface management is found
in various sections of FLPMA. 4 The regulations follow a stair step
approach to regulation, based upon level of disturbance. For casual use and
82. 75 IBLA 16 (1983).
83. Id. at 29.
84. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1732, 1733 and 1740. The BLM rules are found at 43 C.F.R. part
3800. Subpart 3802 contains rules applicable to lands within the wilderness review program. Subpart
3809 sets forth the rules for surface management in public domain lands generally. Prior to FLPMA,
there was no express statutory authority for such rules. However, interestingly, despite the lack of
authority the surface management rules were in draft form prior to the passage of FLPMA.
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negligible disturbance, no notification of BLM is required. 85 Operators
whose operations, including access across federal lands, cause a cumulative
disturbance of five acres or less during a calendar year must notify the
BLM, giving basis information regarding the plans.86 Operations which
will exceed disturbance of five acres require submission and approval of a
plan of operations.8 7 Bonding may be required for an operator under an
approved plan of operation.88
The access provision starts out by acknowledging an operator is
entitled to access to his operations consistent with provisions of the mining
laws.89 It goes on to provide that where a notice of plan of operations is
required, the location of the access route must be specifiedY0 The rules
provide that the BLM officer may require the operator to use existing roads
to minimize the number of access routes and, if practicable, to construct
access roads within a designated transportation or utility corridor.91 When
commercial hauling is involved and the use of an existing road is required,
the BLM officer may require the operator to make appropriate arrange-
ments for use and maintenance.92
The rules applicable to lands within the wilderness review program, so
far as access is concerned, again acknowledge an operator's statutory right
to access under the mining laws. The regulation provides that an operator is
entitled to nonexclusive access to his mining operations consistent with the
provisions of the United States mining laws and departmental regula-
tions.93 It further provides that
[i]n approving access as part of a plan of operations, the
authorized officer shall specify the location of the access route,
the design, construction, operation and maintenance standards,
means of transportation, and other conditions necessary to
prevent impairment of wilderness suitability, protect the envi-
ronment, the public health or safety, federal property and
economic interests, and the interests of other lawful users of
adjacent lands or lands traversed by the access route.94
The Forest Service's surface management rules are apparently
founded upon the Forest Service's Organic Administration Act of 1897. 9'
85. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.1-2 (1985).
86. Id. § 3809.1-3.
87. Id. § 3809.1-4.
88. Id. § 3809.1-9.
89. Id. § 3809.3-3.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. § 3802.4-2.
94. Id.
95. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482, 551 (1982). The rules are found at 36 C.F.R. part 228.
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The Forest Service's rules are somewhat similar to the BLM rules with
regard to a stair step approach to regulation. Generally, a notice of
intention to operate is required from any person proposing to cause surface
disturbance.96 Upon reviewing the notice, if the district ranger determines
the operations will likely cause "significant disturbance of surface re-
sources," the operator is required to submit a proposed plan of operations to
the district ranger, and give more detailed operations.97
The access provisions, again, begin by acknowledging an operator is
entitled to access in connection with operations.9" However, no road, trail,
bridge, landing area, or the like, may be constructed or improved, nor may
any other means of access, including off-road vehicles, be used until the
operator receives approval of an operating plan when one is required.99 In
approving a means of access as part of a plan of operations, the Forest
Service can specify the location of the access route, design standards,
means of transportation, and other conditions reasonably necessary to
protect the environment and forest surface resources, including measures
to protect scenic values and to ensure against erosion and water or air
pollution. 00
Considering the surface management regulations, the question which
is posed is the extent to which the right of access is still a right.
C. Leo Sheep Company v. United States
The access right referred to in the surface management regulations is
the right created by the "mining law," a reference to, basically, the 1872
Mining Law. There is, however, a unique, nonstatutory theory for access
inherent in the decision of the Supreme Court in Leo Sheep Co. v. United
States,'01 which involved an attempt by the United States to gain access
across railroad lands in Wyoming using the doctrine of "implied right-of-
way of necessity." The Supreme Court denied access to the United States
on the ground that, because the United States as the sovereign possessed
the power of eminent domain across private land, it did not need to assert an
implied right-of-way. 102 However, discussion in the case suggested that
private parties may well have an implied right-of-way of necessity across
federal lands to reach mining properties. 0 3
Federal law grants the right of location and patent to the mineral
96. 36 C.F.R. § 228.4 (1986).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 228.12.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
102. Id. at 679-82.
103. Id.
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locator. The doctrine of implied right-of-way provides that one who obtains
a small tract in the middle of a larger tract is entitled to reasonable access
across the larger tract, from the grantor. The duty to grant such an implied
right-of-way is a duty incumbent on the United States acting in its
proprietary capacity, and it may be argued that the right of access to
mining property surrounded by other public lands is not merely at the
sufferance of the United States, but exists by virtue of the common law
doctrine of implied right-of-way of necessity.
D. Regulation-Prohibition
It has become increasingly clear that the rights which miners have
traditionally felt were granted by the 1872 Mining Law will be subjected to
more and more regulation. One question in which both miners and
conservationists have a keen interest is what happens when regulation
reaches the point of being de facto prohibition? 10
A case in which the issue of prohibition was raised is State ex rel
Andrus v. Click,105 which considered the application of a state environ-
mental protection statute to an unpatented mining claim. Under consider-
ation was an Idaho statute which authorized the Board of Land Commis-
sioners to deny a mining permit if the proposed operation "would not be in
the public interest, giving consideration to economic factors, recreational
use for such lands, fish and wildlife habitat and other factors which in the
judgment of the State Land Board may be pertinent."1 6 As a result of
Kleppe, it was clear that the Idaho dredge mining statute applied to the
unpatented claim unless Congress or some federal agency had, by statute
or regulation, preempted the statute. The Idaho Supreme Court addressed
the preemption controversy and concluded that the federal statutes left
room for a state environmental protection permit requirement, so long as
the state law did not prohibit or render impossible all the mining activities
on the unpatented claim.'0 7 The court recognized that a valid placer claim
is a valuable property right. The court asked two questions: (1) Did
Congress in the particular instance evidence an intent to occupy the
legislative field so that all state law within the field is preempted? (2) Does
the state law actually conflict with federal law so that compliance with both
laws is impossible or the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment to the full purpose and objectives of Congress?'0 8
104. See Freyfogle, Federal Lands and Local Communities, 27 ARIz. L. REV. 653 (1985),
reprinted in 24 PuB. LAND. & RESOURCES L. DIG. 90 (1987).
105. 97 Idaho 791, 554 P.2d 969 (1976).
106. Id. at 796, 554 P.2d at 974 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 47-1317(h)).
107. Id. at 798, 554 P.2d at 976.
108. Id. at 796-97, 554 P.2d at 974-75.
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After concluding that nothing in the language or history of the mining
laws reflected congressional intent to occupy entirely the field of mining
regulation, the court assumed that a state statute that rendered mining
impossible always conflicts with the federal mining laws.109 The question,
the court said, was not whether compliance with both statutes was in any
way possible, but whether the mining claimant could comply with both
statutes.110 The court did not address the constitutional significance of a
permit denial because this possibility was not raised by the facts in the case.
Instead the court concluded that a permit denial which renders .mining
operations impossible generates an actual impermissible conflict between
the federal and state schemes.1"1
In searching for actual federal-state conflict to satisfy the second
prong of its test, the court noted that it was hope of economic development
that prompted the Mining Law of 1872 in the first instance. 112 The court
quoted at length from the 1970 pro-mining policy statements set forth by
the Congress in the Mining and Minerals Policy Act.113 Clearly, the court
presumed, without discussing the evidence, that mining is the dominant,
essential federal objective."1
The cases seem to indicate that no one, not the miners or conservation-
ists, or either the federal or state governments, wants to directly confront
the problem of permit denial. In both Click and Granite Rock, the courts
find pathways to avoid the problems presented by permit denial, with the
concomitant constitutional "taking" issues.
E. Taking Issues
Hovering in the background in every case in which the distinction
between regulation and prohibition is in issue is the question whether there
has been a "taking" in violation of the constitutional prohibition against
taking private property for public use without just compensation.115
When may there be a taking? It is a question without simple answers,
but at least since the spring and summer of 1987, property owners can take
heart. Three cases were decided by the Supreme Court dealing with the
issue: Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. Pennsylvania Depart-
109. Id. at 796, 554 P.2d at 974.
110. Id. at 797, 554 P.2d at 975.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 798, 554 P.2d at 976.
113. Id. at 799, 554 P.2d at 977; see, 30 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1982).
114. In a recent decision, Montana Talc Co. v. Cyprus Mines Corp., -Mont-, 748
P.2d 444 (1987), the Montana Supreme Court made a similar finding, i.e., mining a dominant objective
of legislation. Accord Brubaker v. Bd. of County Commissioners, 652 P.2d 1050 (Colo. 1982).
115. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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ment of Environmental Resources,116 First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,"" and Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission."1 In Keystone, Pennsylvania's Coal Subsidence Act
was determined not to create a taking even though it prevented mining of
substantial quantities of coal, because it was found that the business could
still be profitably 9perated without the coal which was denied by the Act." 9
First Lutheran decided that land regulation can be a taking even for a
temporary period of time for which just compensation is due directly under
the 5th and 14th Amendments.1 20 This case filled the gap left by Agins v.
City of Tiburon,'2' which avoided confronting the zoning issue as not
"ripe" because a development proposal had not been submitted to the city
for action.
Finally, Nollan found a "development exaction" to be a taking which
is both regulatory and physical. 22 A development exaction is a condition
placed upon a building permit by a regulatory authority which may or may
not prevent the development from being applied for. The Court specifically
held the condition attached to a building permit was a taking, in that the
condition was not directly connected to a substantial advancement of a
legitimate government interest. 2  The Court also stated that higher
scrutiny of government action was required under the Takings Clause, as
opposed to the mere "rational" standard previously used in due process or
equal protection challenges.' 24
F. Agency Discretion
No discussion of the effect of FLPMA and other various recent federal
enactments concerning uses of public lands is complete without mention of
agency discretion. The BLM and the Forest Service, on the federal level,
and various state agencies under state enactments, have been vested with
huge amounts of discretion.
With regard to location of claims, federal lands not withdrawn from
location are open for entry without the need for prior agency clearance.
However, nearly all operations on the claims, once located, become
116. 94 L. Ed.2d 472 (1987).
117. 96 L. Ed.2d 250 (1987).
118. 97 L. Ed.2d 677 (1987).
119. Keystone, 94 L. Ed.2d at 498.
120. First Lutheran, 96 L. Ed.2d at 258.
121. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
122. Nollan, 97 L. Ed.2d at 689.
123. Id.
124. Id. An exhaustive treatment of this can be found in the proceedings of the 1987 Land Use
Institute in Reno, Nevada, sponsored by the Florida-Atlantic University/Florida International
University Joint Center for Environmental and Urban Problems (FAU/FIU).
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involved with discretionary agency decision making. In the case of mineral
leasing, the BLM has complete discretionary power to decide whether
public lands under its jurisdiction should be open for lease applications.
The Forest Service has broad discretion under the National Forest
Management Act,1 5 although the Act limits the use of certain harvesting
techniques and requires the protection of marginally productive timber-
lands and places certain substantive limits on Forest Service flexibility."'
Grazing on federal range is also subject to broad agency discretion to
commit rangeland to alternative uses and, in the case of timberlands,
grazing activities are governed by recent legislation that restrains agency
discretion by mandating greater concerns for land conservation and for the
maintenance of long-term land productivity. 12 7
Basically, Congress has given responsible agencies a very difficult
multiple use mandate by determining that wilderness is consistent with
multiple use 28 and by letting stand mining and mineral leasing laws that
authorize additional competing land uses. It is up to the agencies, through
exercise of the discretion they have been given, to make sense out of the
situation.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970,129 reflects a Congress
benevolent toward the mining industry and understanding of the problems
of the industry. The statute states, in part:
It shall be the responsibility of the Secretary of the Interior to
carry out this policy when exercising his authority under such
programs as may be authorized by law other than this section.
For this purpose the Secretary of the Interior shall include in his
annual report to Congress a report on the state of the domestic
mining, minerals, and mineral reclamation industries, including
a statement in the trend in utilization and depletion of these
resources, together with such recommendations for legislative
programs as may be necessary to implement the policy of this
section. 130
Contrast this statement with Congress's statement in the Wilderness
Act:
A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own
works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area
125. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1982).
126. Id. §§ 1604(g)(3)(E) and (m).
127. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(3) (1982).
128. 16 U.S.C. § 529 (1982).
129. 30 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1982).
130. Id.
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where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by
man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.'
Also:
In order to assure that an increasing population, accompanied by
expanding settlement and growing mechanization, does not
occupy and modify all areas within the United States and its
possessions, leaving no lands designated for preservation and
protection in their natural condition. . .there is hereby estab-
lished a National Wilderness Preservation System to be com-
posed of federally owned areas designated by Congress. .... '
Very clearly, these statements are very difficult to reconcile. The role
of FLPMA may best be summarized as a tool to assist in the reconciliation.
It tends to recognize both perspectives and attempts to provide enough
direction, together with delegated authority, to allow the responsible
agencies to deal with the continuing and evolving problems of reconciling
the old with the new.
131. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1982).
132. Id. § 1131(a).
1988]

